9.3

security/openssh-portable/Makefile

@@ -1,15 +1,14 @@
-# Created by: dwcjr@inethouston.net
-
 PORTNAME=	openssh
-DISTVERSION=	8.8p1
+DISTVERSION=	9.3p2
 PORTREVISION=	1
-PORTEPOCH=	1
+PORTEPOCH=	3
 CATEGORIES=	security
 MASTER_SITES=	OPENBSD/OpenSSH/portable
 PKGNAMESUFFIX?=	-portable
 
 MAINTAINER=	bdrewery@FreeBSD.org
 COMMENT=	The portable version of OpenBSD's OpenSSH
+WWW=		https://www.openssh.com/portable.html
 
 LICENSE=	OPENSSH
 LICENSE_NAME=	OpenSSH Licenses
@@ -67,6 +66,8 @@ BLACKLISTD_DESC=	FreeBSD blacklistd(8) support
 
 OPTIONS_SUB=		yes
 
+PAM_EXTRA_PATCHES=	${FILESDIR}/extra-patch-pam-sshd_config
+
 TCP_WRAPPERS_EXTRA_PATCHES=${FILESDIR}/extra-patch-tcpwrappers
 
 LDNS_CONFIGURE_WITH=	ldns=${LOCALBASE}
@@ -100,21 +101,22 @@ PATCH_SITES+=	http://mirror.shatow.net/freebsd/${PORTNAME}/:DEFAULT,hpn,gsskex
 
 # Must add this patch before HPN due to conflicts
 .if ${PORT_OPTIONS:MKERB_GSSAPI} || ${FLAVOR:U} == gssapi
-BROKEN=	KERB_GSSAPI No patch for ${DISTVERSION} yet.
+#BROKEN=	KERB_GSSAPI No patch for ${DISTVERSION} yet.
 .  if ${PORT_OPTIONS:MHPN} || ${PORT_OPTIONS:MNONECIPHER}
 # Needed glue for applying HPN patch without conflict
 EXTRA_PATCHES+=	${FILESDIR}/extra-patch-hpn-gss-glue
 .  endif
 # - See https://sources.debian.org/data/main/o/openssh/ for which subdir to
 # pull from.
-GSSAPI_DEBIAN_SUBDIR=	${DISTVERSION}-2
+GSSAPI_DEBIAN_VERSION=	9.4p1
+GSSAPI_DEBIAN_SUBDIR=	${GSSAPI_DEBIAN_VERSION:U${DISTVERSION}}-1
 # - Debian does not use a versioned filename so we trick fetch to make one for
 # us with the ?<anything>=/ trick.
 PATCH_SITES+=	https://sources.debian.org/data/main/o/openssh/1:${GSSAPI_DEBIAN_SUBDIR}/debian/patches/gssapi.patch?dummy=/:gsskex
 # Bump this when updating the patch location
-GSSAPI_UPDATE_DATE=	20200607
-PATCHFILES+=	openssh-${DISTVERSION}-gsskex-all-20141021-debian-rh-${GSSAPI_UPDATE_DATE}.patch:-p1:gsskex
-EXTRA_PATCHES+=	${FILESDIR}/extra-patch-gssapi-sshconnect2.c
+GSSAPI_DISTVERSION=	9.4p1
+PATCHFILES+=	openssh-${GSSAPI_DISTVERSION:U${DISTVERSION}}-gsskex-all-debian-rh-${GSSAPI_DISTVERSION}.patch:-p1:gsskex
+EXTRA_PATCHES+=	${FILESDIR}/extra-patch-gssapi-auth2-gss.c
 EXTRA_PATCHES+=	${FILESDIR}/extra-patch-gssapi-kexgssc.c
 EXTRA_PATCHES+=	${FILESDIR}/extra-patch-gssapi-kexgsss.c
 .endif

security/openssh-portable/distinfo

@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
-TIMESTAMP = 1634059537
-SHA256 (openssh-8.8p1.tar.gz) = 4590890ea9bb9ace4f71ae331785a3a5823232435161960ed5fc86588f331fe9
-SIZE (openssh-8.8p1.tar.gz) = 1815060
+TIMESTAMP = 1695396338
+SHA256 (openssh-9.3p2.tar.gz) = 200ebe147f6cb3f101fd0cdf9e02442af7ddca298dffd9f456878e7ccac676e8
+SIZE (openssh-9.3p2.tar.gz) = 1835850
+SHA256 (openssh-9.4p1-gsskex-all-debian-rh-9.4p1.patch) = 9492c1db4307aa3fe6e12d77fff01376bf275af2980ae55b926a505aae9e9b14
+SIZE (openssh-9.4p1-gsskex-all-debian-rh-9.4p1.patch) = 131674

security/openssh-portable/files/extra-patch-blacklistd

@@ -351,15 +351,15 @@
  
  	if (use_privsep) {
  		if (privsep_preauth(ssh) == 1)
---- Makefile.in.orig	2020-11-16 16:27:13.408700000 -0800
-+++ Makefile.in	2020-11-16 16:28:28.083007000 -0800
-@@ -180,6 +180,8 @@ FIXPATHSCMD	= $(SED) $(PATHSUBS)
+--- Makefile.in.orig	2022-10-03 07:51:42.000000000 -0700
++++ Makefile.in	2022-10-09 10:50:06.401377000 -0700
+@@ -185,6 +185,8 @@ FIXALGORITHMSCMD= $(SHELL) $(srcdir)/fixalgorithms $(S
  FIXALGORITHMSCMD= $(SHELL) $(srcdir)/fixalgorithms $(SED) \
  		     @UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHMS@
  
 +LIBSSH_OBJS+=	blacklist.o
 +
- all: configure-check $(CONFIGFILES) $(MANPAGES) $(TARGETS)
+ all: $(CONFIGFILES) $(MANPAGES) $(TARGETS)
  
  $(LIBSSH_OBJS): Makefile.in config.h
 --- sshd_config.orig	2020-11-16 16:57:14.276036000 -0800

security/openssh-portable/files/extra-patch-gssapi-auth2-gss.c

@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+--- auth2-gss.c.orig	2022-03-03 10:56:35.668672000 -0800
++++ auth2-gss.c	2022-03-03 11:03:16.048838000 -0800
+@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ static int input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, struct 
+  * The 'gssapi_keyex' userauth mechanism.
+  */
+ static int
+-userauth_gsskeyex(struct ssh *ssh)
++userauth_gsskeyex(struct ssh *ssh, const char *method)
+ {
+ 	Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
+ 	int r, authenticated = 0;
+@@ -373,6 +373,7 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh 
+ 
+ Authmethod method_gsskeyex = {
+ 	"gssapi-keyex",
++	NULL,
+ 	userauth_gsskeyex,
+ 	&options.gss_authentication
+ };

security/openssh-portable/files/extra-patch-gssapi-sshconnect2.c

@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
-Avoid free(const char*)
---- sshconnect2.c.orig	2020-11-19 14:56:54.387846000 -0800
-+++ sshconnect2.c	2020-11-19 14:57:04.445045000 -0800
-@@ -846,7 +846,7 @@ userauth_gssapi(struct ssh *ssh)
- 		/* Fall back to specified host if we are using proxy command
- 		 * and can not use DNS on that socket */
- 		if (strcmp(gss_host, "UNKNOWN") == 0) {
--			gss_host = authctxt->host;
-+			gss_host = xstrdup(authctxt->host);
- 		}
- 	} else {
- 		gss_host = xstrdup(authctxt->host);

security/openssh-portable/files/extra-patch-hpn

@@ -131,9 +131,9 @@ diff -urN -x configure -x config.guess -x config.h.in -x config.sub work.clean/o
 +	 (tasota@gmail.com) an NSF REU grant recipient for 2013. 
 +	 This work was financed, in part, by Cisco System, Inc., the National 
 +         Library of Medicine, and the National Science Foundation. 
---- work/openssh/channels.c.orig	2021-04-15 20:55:25.000000000 -0700
-+++ work/openssh/channels.c	2021-04-28 14:35:20.732518000 -0700
-@@ -220,6 +220,12 @@ static int rdynamic_connect_finish(struct ssh *, Chann
+--- channels.c.orig	2023-02-02 04:21:54.000000000 -0800
++++ channels.c	2023-02-03 10:45:34.136793000 -0800
+@@ -229,6 +229,12 @@ static void channel_handler_init(struct ssh_channels *
  /* Setup helper */
  static void channel_handler_init(struct ssh_channels *sc);
  
@@ -146,7 +146,7 @@ diff -urN -x configure -x config.guess -x config.h.in -x config.sub work.clean/o
  /* -- channel core */
  
  void
-@@ -395,6 +401,9 @@ channel_new(struct ssh *ssh, char *ctype, int type, in
+@@ -495,6 +501,9 @@ channel_new(struct ssh *ssh, char *ctype, int type, in
  	c->local_window = window;
  	c->local_window_max = window;
  	c->local_maxpacket = maxpack;
@@ -156,8 +156,8 @@ diff -urN -x configure -x config.guess -x config.h.in -x config.sub work.clean/o
  	c->remote_name = xstrdup(remote_name);
  	c->ctl_chan = -1;
  	c->delayed = 1;		/* prevent call to channel_post handler */
-@@ -1082,6 +1091,30 @@ channel_pre_connecting(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c,
- 	FD_SET(c->sock, writeset);
+@@ -1190,6 +1199,30 @@ channel_set_fds(struct ssh *ssh, int id, int rfd, int 
+ 		fatal_fr(r, "channel %i", c->self);
  }
  
 +#ifdef HPN_ENABLED
@@ -185,9 +185,9 @@ diff -urN -x configure -x config.guess -x config.h.in -x config.sub work.clean/o
 +#endif
 +
  static void
- channel_pre_open(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c,
-     fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
-@@ -2124,18 +2157,29 @@ channel_check_window(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c)
+ channel_pre_listener(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c)
+ {
+@@ -2301,18 +2334,29 @@ channel_check_window(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c)
  	    c->local_maxpacket*3) ||
  	    c->local_window < c->local_window_max/2) &&
  	    c->local_consumed > 0) {
@@ -220,7 +220,7 @@ diff -urN -x configure -x config.guess -x config.h.in -x config.sub work.clean/o
  		c->local_consumed = 0;
  	}
  	return 1;
-@@ -3302,6 +3346,17 @@ channel_fwd_bind_addr(struct ssh *ssh, const char *lis
+@@ -3709,6 +3753,17 @@ channel_fwd_bind_addr(struct ssh *ssh, const char *lis
  	return addr;
  }
  
@@ -238,7 +238,7 @@ diff -urN -x configure -x config.guess -x config.h.in -x config.sub work.clean/o
  static int
  channel_setup_fwd_listener_tcpip(struct ssh *ssh, int type,
      struct Forward *fwd, int *allocated_listen_port,
-@@ -3442,6 +3497,17 @@ channel_setup_fwd_listener_tcpip(struct ssh *ssh, int 
+@@ -3848,6 +3903,17 @@ channel_setup_fwd_listener_tcpip(struct ssh *ssh, int 
  		}
  
  		/* Allocate a channel number for the socket. */
@@ -248,15 +248,15 @@ diff -urN -x configure -x config.guess -x config.h.in -x config.sub work.clean/o
 +		 * window size.
 +		 */
 +		if (!hpn_disabled)
-+			c = channel_new(ssh, "port listener", type, sock, sock, -1,
-+			    hpn_buffer_size, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT,
++			c = channel_new(ssh, "port listener", type, sock, sock,
++			    -1, hpn_buffer_size, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT,
 +			    0, "port listener", 1);
 +		else
 +#endif
- 		c = channel_new(ssh, "port listener", type, sock, sock, -1,
+ 		c = channel_new(ssh, "port-listener", type, sock, sock, -1,
  		    CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT,
  		    0, "port listener", 1);
-@@ -4610,6 +4676,14 @@ x11_create_display_inet(struct ssh *ssh, int x11_displ
+@@ -5016,6 +5082,14 @@ x11_create_display_inet(struct ssh *ssh, int x11_displ
  	*chanids = xcalloc(num_socks + 1, sizeof(**chanids));
  	for (n = 0; n < num_socks; n++) {
  		sock = socks[n];
@@ -268,7 +268,7 @@ diff -urN -x configure -x config.guess -x config.h.in -x config.sub work.clean/o
 +			    0, "X11 inet listener", 1);
 +		else
 +#endif
- 		nc = channel_new(ssh, "x11 listener",
+ 		nc = channel_new(ssh, "x11-listener",
  		    SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER, sock, sock, -1,
  		    CHAN_X11_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_X11_PACKET_DEFAULT,
 --- work/openssh-7.7p1/channels.h.orig	2018-04-01 22:38:28.000000000 -0700
@@ -309,9 +309,9 @@ diff -urN -x configure -x config.guess -x config.h.in -x config.sub work.clean/o
  			free(cipher_list);
  			return 0;
  		}
---- work/openssh-7.7p1/clientloop.c.orig	2018-04-01 22:38:28.000000000 -0700
-+++ work/openssh-7.7p1/clientloop.c	2018-06-27 16:40:24.560906000 -0700
-@@ -1549,6 +1549,15 @@ client_request_x11(struct ssh *ssh, const char *reques
+--- work/openssh/clientloop.c.orig	2022-02-23 03:31:11.000000000 -0800
++++ work/openssh/clientloop.c	2022-03-02 12:53:47.624273000 -0800
+@@ -1571,6 +1571,15 @@ client_request_x11(struct ssh *ssh, const char *reques
  	sock = x11_connect_display(ssh);
  	if (sock < 0)
  		return NULL;
@@ -327,10 +327,10 @@ diff -urN -x configure -x config.guess -x config.h.in -x config.sub work.clean/o
  	c = channel_new(ssh, "x11",
  	    SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN, sock, sock, -1,
  	    CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_X11_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, "x11", 1);
-@@ -1574,6 +1583,14 @@ client_request_agent(struct ssh *ssh, const char *requ
- 			    __func__, ssh_err(r));
- 		return NULL;
- 	}
+@@ -1606,6 +1615,14 @@ client_request_agent(struct ssh *ssh, const char *requ
+ 	else
+ 		debug2_fr(r, "ssh_agent_bind_hostkey");
+ 
 +#ifdef HPN_ENABLED
 +	if (!options.hpn_disabled)
 +		c = channel_new(ssh, "authentication agent connection",
@@ -342,7 +342,7 @@ diff -urN -x configure -x config.guess -x config.h.in -x config.sub work.clean/o
  	c = channel_new(ssh, "authentication agent connection",
  	    SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN, sock, sock, -1,
  	    CHAN_X11_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0,
-@@ -1602,6 +1619,12 @@ client_request_tun_fwd(struct ssh *ssh, int tun_mode,
+@@ -1634,6 +1651,12 @@ client_request_tun_fwd(struct ssh *ssh, int tun_mode,
  	}
  	debug("Tunnel forwarding using interface %s", ifname);
  
@@ -1119,9 +1119,9 @@ diff -urN -x configure -x config.guess -x config.h.in -x config.sub work.clean/o
  		sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "banner exchange");
  
  	/* Put the connection into non-blocking mode. */
---- work/openssh/sshconnect2.c.orig	2021-08-19 21:03:49.000000000 -0700
-+++ work/openssh/sshconnect2.c	2021-09-08 10:02:03.037982000 -0700
-@@ -84,7 +84,13 @@
+--- work/openssh/sshconnect2.c.orig	2023-03-15 14:28:19.000000000 -0700
++++ work/openssh/sshconnect2.c	2023-05-19 14:20:01.965073000 -0700
+@@ -83,7 +83,13 @@ extern Options options;
  extern char *client_version_string;
  extern char *server_version_string;
  extern Options options;
@@ -1135,29 +1135,7 @@ diff -urN -x configure -x config.guess -x config.h.in -x config.sub work.clean/o
  /*
   * SSH2 key exchange
   */
-@@ -212,11 +218,12 @@ order_hostkeyalgs(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostadd
- 	return ret;
- }
- 
-+static char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX];
-+static const char *myproposal_default[PROPOSAL_MAX] = { KEX_CLIENT };
- void
- ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port,
-     const struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo)
- {
--	char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX] = { KEX_CLIENT };
- 	char *s, *all_key;
- 	int r, use_known_hosts_order = 0;
- 
-@@ -241,6 +248,7 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, struct sockaddr 
- 		fatal_fr(r, "kex_assemble_namelist");
- 	free(all_key);
- 
-+	memcpy(&myproposal, &myproposal_default, sizeof(myproposal));
- 	if ((s = kex_names_cat(options.kex_algorithms, "ext-info-c")) == NULL)
- 		fatal_f("kex_names_cat");
- 	myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = compat_kex_proposal(ssh, s);
-@@ -487,6 +495,29 @@ ssh_userauth2(struct ssh *ssh, const char *local_user,
+@@ -482,6 +488,34 @@ ssh_userauth2(struct ssh *ssh, const char *local_user,
  
  	if (!authctxt.success)
  		fatal("Authentication failed.");
@@ -1169,11 +1147,16 @@ diff -urN -x configure -x config.guess -x config.h.in -x config.sub work.clean/o
 +	 * tty allocated.
 +	 */
 +	if ((options.none_switch == 1) && (options.none_enabled == 1)) {
++		char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX];
++		char *s = NULL;
++		const char *none_cipher = "none";
++
 +		if (!tty_flag) { /* no null on tty sessions */
 +			debug("Requesting none rekeying...");
-+			memcpy(&myproposal, &myproposal_default, sizeof(myproposal));
-+			myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = "none";
-+			myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] = "none";
++			kex_proposal_populate_entries(ssh, myproposal, s, none_cipher,
++			    options.macs,
++			    compression_alg_list(options.compression),
++			    options.hostkeyalgorithms);
 +			kex_prop2buf(ssh->kex->my, myproposal);
 +			packet_request_rekeying();
 +			fprintf(stderr, "WARNING: ENABLED NONE CIPHER\n");
@@ -1286,11 +1269,11 @@ diff -urN -x configure -x config.guess -x config.h.in -x config.sub work.clean/o
  # Example of overriding settings on a per-user basis
  #Match User anoncvs
  #	X11Forwarding no
---- work/openssh-7.7p1/version.h.orig	2018-04-01 22:38:28.000000000 -0700
-+++ work/openssh-7.7p1/version.h	2018-06-27 17:13:57.263086000 -0700
+--- version.h.orig	2023-07-18 23:31:34.000000000 -0700
++++ version.h	2023-07-21 07:27:08.311422000 -0700
 @@ -4,3 +4,4 @@
  
- #define SSH_PORTABLE	"p1"
+ #define SSH_PORTABLE	"p2"
  #define SSH_RELEASE	SSH_VERSION SSH_PORTABLE
 +#define SSH_HPN         "-hpn14v15"
 --- work/openssh/kex.h.orig	2019-07-10 17:35:36.523216000 -0700

security/openssh-portable/files/extra-patch-hpn-compat

@@ -16,12 +16,12 @@ r294563 was incomplete; re-add the client-side options as well.
 
 ------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
---- readconf.c.orig	2021-04-27 11:24:15.916596000 -0700
-+++ readconf.c	2021-04-27 11:25:24.222034000 -0700
-@@ -316,6 +316,12 @@ static struct {
- 	{ "proxyjump", oProxyJump },
- 	{ "securitykeyprovider", oSecurityKeyProvider },
+--- readconf.c.orig	2023-02-03 11:17:45.506822000 -0800
++++ readconf.c	2023-02-03 11:30:14.894959000 -0800
+@@ -323,6 +323,12 @@ static struct {
  	{ "knownhostscommand", oKnownHostsCommand },
+ 	{ "requiredrsasize", oRequiredRSASize },
+ 	{ "enableescapecommandline", oEnableEscapeCommandline },
 +	{ "hpndisabled", oDeprecated },
 +	{ "hpnbuffersize", oDeprecated },
 +	{ "tcprcvbufpoll", oDeprecated },
@@ -31,12 +31,12 @@ r294563 was incomplete; re-add the client-side options as well.
  
  	{ NULL, oBadOption }
  };
---- servconf.c.orig	2020-02-13 16:40:54.000000000 -0800
-+++ servconf.c	2020-03-21 17:01:18.011062000 -0700
+--- servconf.c.orig	2023-02-02 04:21:54.000000000 -0800
++++ servconf.c	2023-02-03 11:31:00.387624000 -0800
 @@ -695,6 +695,10 @@ static struct {
- 	{ "rdomain", sRDomain, SSHCFG_ALL },
- 	{ "casignaturealgorithms", sCASignatureAlgorithms, SSHCFG_ALL },
- 	{ "securitykeyprovider", sSecurityKeyProvider, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "requiredrsasize", sRequiredRSASize, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ 	{ "channeltimeout", sChannelTimeout, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ 	{ "unusedconnectiontimeout", sUnusedConnectionTimeout, SSHCFG_ALL },
 +	{ "noneenabled", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
 +	{ "hpndisabled", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_ALL },
 +	{ "hpnbuffersize", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_ALL },

security/openssh-portable/files/extra-patch-pam-sshd_config

@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+--- sshd_config.nopam	2022-02-11 19:19:59.515475000 +0000
++++ sshd_config	2022-02-11 19:20:45.334738000 +0000
+@@ -55,8 +55,8 @@
+ # Don't read the user's ~/.rhosts and ~/.shosts files
+ #IgnoreRhosts yes
+ 
+-# To disable tunneled clear text passwords, change to no here!
+-#PasswordAuthentication yes
++# To enable tunneled clear text passwords, change to yes here!
++#PasswordAuthentication no
+ #PermitEmptyPasswords no
+ 
+ # Change to no to disable s/key passwords
+@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@
+ #GSSAPIAuthentication no
+ #GSSAPICleanupCredentials yes
+ 
+-# Set this to 'yes' to enable PAM authentication, account processing,
++# Set this to 'no' to disable PAM authentication, account processing,
+ # and session processing. If this is enabled, PAM authentication will
+ # be allowed through the KbdInteractiveAuthentication and
+ # PasswordAuthentication.  Depending on your PAM configuration,
+@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@
+ # If you just want the PAM account and session checks to run without
+ # PAM authentication, then enable this but set PasswordAuthentication
+ # and KbdInteractiveAuthentication to 'no'.
+-#UsePAM no
++#UsePAM yes
+ 
+ #AllowAgentForwarding yes
+ #AllowTcpForwarding yes

security/openssh-portable/files/extra-patch-tcpwrappers

@@ -83,11 +83,9 @@ index 0ade557..045f149 100644
  
  	/* Log the connection. */
  	laddr = get_local_ipaddr(sock_in);
-diff --git configure.ac configure.ac
-index f48ba4a..66fbe82 100644
---- configure.ac.orig	2019-04-17 15:52:57.000000000 -0700
-+++ configure.ac	2019-07-02 20:58:48.627832000 -0700
-@@ -1494,6 +1494,62 @@ else
+--- configure.ac.orig	2022-02-23 03:31:11.000000000 -0800
++++ configure.ac	2022-03-02 12:47:49.958341000 -0800
+@@ -1599,6 +1599,62 @@ else
  	AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
  fi
  
@@ -150,11 +148,11 @@ index f48ba4a..66fbe82 100644
  # Check whether user wants to use ldns
  LDNS_MSG="no"
  AC_ARG_WITH(ldns,
-@@ -5245,6 +5301,7 @@ echo "                       PAM support: $PAM_MSG"
+@@ -5593,6 +5649,7 @@ echo "                       PAM support: $PAM_MSG"
  echo "                   OSF SIA support: $SIA_MSG"
  echo "                 KerberosV support: $KRB5_MSG"
  echo "                   SELinux support: $SELINUX_MSG"
 +echo "              TCP Wrappers support: $TCPW_MSG"
- echo "              MD5 password support: $MD5_MSG"
  echo "                   libedit support: $LIBEDIT_MSG"
  echo "                   libldns support: $LDNS_MSG"
+ echo "  Solaris process contract support: $SPC_MSG"

security/openssh-portable/files/openssh.in

@@ -22,6 +22,16 @@ load_rc_config ${name}
 : ${openssh_enable:="NO"}
 : ${openssh_skipportscheck="NO"}
 
+# These only control ssh-keygen automatically generating host keys.
+: ${openssh_dsa_enable="YES"}
+: ${openssh_dsa_flags=""}
+: ${openssh_rsa_enable="YES"}
+: ${openssh_rsa_flags=""}
+: ${openssh_ecdsa_enable="YES"}
+: ${openssh_ecdsa_flags=""}
+: ${openssh_ed25519_enable="YES"}
+: ${openssh_ed25519_flags=""}
+
 command=%%PREFIX%%/sbin/sshd
 extra_commands="configtest reload keygen"
 start_precmd="${name}_checks"
@@ -33,10 +43,16 @@ pidfile=${openssh_pidfile:="/var/run/sshd.pid"}
 
 openssh_keygen()
 {
-	if [ -f %%ETCDIR%%/ssh_host_dsa_key -a \
-	    -f %%ETCDIR%%/ssh_host_rsa_key -a \
-	    -f %%ETCDIR%%/ssh_host_ecdsa_key -a \
-	    -f %%ETCDIR%%/ssh_host_ed25519_key ]; then
+	local skip_dsa= skip_rsa= skip_ecdsa= skip_ed25519=
+	checkyesno openssh_dsa_enable || skip_dsa=y
+	checkyesno openssh_rsa_enable || skip_rsa=y
+	checkyesno openssh_ecdsa_enable || skip_ecdsa=y
+	checkyesno openssh_ed25519_enable || skip_ed25519=y
+
+	if [ \( -n "$skip_dsa" -o -f %%ETCDIR%%/ssh_host_dsa_key \) -a \
+	    \( -n "$skip_rsa" -o -f %%ETCDIR%%/ssh_host_rsa_key \) -a \
+	    \( -n "$skip_ecdsa" -o -f %%ETCDIR%%/ssh_host_ecdsa_key \) -a \
+	    \( -n "$skip_ed25519" -o -f %%ETCDIR%%/ssh_host_ed25519_key \) ]; then
 		return 0
 	fi
 
@@ -50,8 +66,8 @@ openssh_keygen()
 		echo "You already have a DSA host key" \
 			"in %%ETCDIR%%/ssh_host_dsa_key"
 		echo "Skipping protocol version 2 DSA Key Generation"
-	else
-		%%PREFIX%%/bin/ssh-keygen -t dsa \
+	elif checkyesno openssh_dsa_enable; then
+		%%PREFIX%%/bin/ssh-keygen -t dsa $openssh_dsa_flags \
 			-f %%ETCDIR%%/ssh_host_dsa_key -N ''
 	fi
 
@@ -59,8 +75,8 @@ openssh_keygen()
 		echo "You already have a RSA host key" \
 			"in %%ETCDIR%%/ssh_host_rsa_key"
 		echo "Skipping protocol version 2 RSA Key Generation"
-	else
-		%%PREFIX%%/bin/ssh-keygen -t rsa \
+	elif checkyesno openssh_rsa_enable; then
+		%%PREFIX%%/bin/ssh-keygen -t rsa $openssh_rsa_flags \
 			-f %%ETCDIR%%/ssh_host_rsa_key -N ''
 	fi
 
@@ -68,8 +84,8 @@ openssh_keygen()
 		echo "You already have a Elliptic Curve DSA host key" \
 			"in %%ETCDIR%%/ssh_host_ecdsa_key"
 		echo "Skipping protocol version 2 Elliptic Curve DSA Key Generation"
-	else
-		%%PREFIX%%/bin/ssh-keygen -t ecdsa \
+	elif checkyesno openssh_ecdsa_enable; then
+		%%PREFIX%%/bin/ssh-keygen -t ecdsa $openssh_ecdsa_flags \
 			-f %%ETCDIR%%/ssh_host_ecdsa_key -N ''
 	fi
 
@@ -77,8 +93,8 @@ openssh_keygen()
 		echo "You already have a Elliptic Curve ED25519 host key" \
 			"in %%ETCDIR%%/ssh_host_ed25519_key"
 		echo "Skipping protocol version 2 Elliptic Curve ED25519 Key Generation"
-	else
-		%%PREFIX%%/bin/ssh-keygen -t ed25519 \
+	elif checkyesno openssh_ed25519_enable; then
+		%%PREFIX%%/bin/ssh-keygen -t ed25519 $openssh_ed22519_flags \
 			-f %%ETCDIR%%/ssh_host_ed25519_key -N ''
 	fi
 }
@@ -156,7 +172,7 @@ openssh_checks()
       fi
 	fi
 
-	run_rc_command keygen
+	openssh_keygen
 	openssh_configtest
 }
 

security/openssh-portable/files/patch-FreeBSD-cap_cache_tzdata

@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+diff --git a/security/openssh-portable/files/patch-FreeBSD-caph_cache_tzdata b/security/openssh-portable/files/patch-FreeBSD-caph_cache_tzdata
+new file mode 100644
+index 000000000000..bf3889265b77
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/security/openssh-portable/files/patch-FreeBSD-caph_cache_tzdata
+@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
++commit fc3c19a9fceeea48a9259ac3833a125804342c0e
++Author: Ed Maste <emaste@FreeBSD.org>
++Date:   Sat Oct 6 21:32:55 2018 +0000
++
++    sshd: address capsicum issues
++    
++    * Add a wrapper to proxy login_getpwclass(3) as it is not allowed in
++      capability mode.
++    * Cache timezone data via caph_cache_tzdata() as we cannot access the
++      timezone file.
++    * Reverse resolve hostname before entering capability mode.
++    
++    PR:             231172
++    Submitted by:   naito.yuichiro@gmail.com
++    Reviewed by:    cem, des
++    Approved by:    re (rgrimes)
++    MFC after:      3 weeks
++    Differential Revision:  https://reviews.freebsd.org/D17128
++
++Notes:
++    svn path=/head/; revision=339216
++
++diff --git crypto/openssh/sandbox-capsicum.c crypto/openssh/sandbox-capsicum.c
++index 5f41d526292b..f728abd18250 100644
++--- sandbox-capsicum.c
+++++ sandbox-capsicum.c
++@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ __RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
++ #include <stdlib.h>
++ #include <string.h>
++ #include <unistd.h>
+++#include <capsicum_helpers.h>
++ 
++ #include "log.h"
++ #include "monitor.h"
++@@ -71,6 +72,8 @@ ssh_sandbox_child(struct ssh_sandbox *box)
++ 	struct rlimit rl_zero;
++ 	cap_rights_t rights;
++ 
+++	caph_cache_tzdata();
+++
++ 	rl_zero.rlim_cur = rl_zero.rlim_max = 0;
++ 
++ 	if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, &rl_zero) == -1)

security/openssh-portable/files/patch-FreeBSD-logincap

@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+(pulled from the PR)
+
+commit 27ceebbc2402e4c98203c7eef9696f4bd3d326f8
+Author: Ed Maste <emaste@FreeBSD.org>
+Date:   Tue Aug 31 15:30:50 2021 -0400
+
+    openssh: simplify login class restrictions
+
+    Login class-based restrictions were introduced in 5b400a39b8ad.  The
+    code was adapted for sshd's Capsicum sandbox and received many changes
+    over time, including at least fc3c19a9fcee, bd393de91cc3, and
+    e8c56fba2926.
+
+    During an attempt to upstream the work a much simpler approach was
+    suggested.  Adopt it now in the in-tree OpenSSH to reduce conflicts with
+    future updates.
+
+    Submitted by:   Yuchiro Naito (against OpenSSH-portable on GitHub)
+    Obtained from:  https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/pull/262
+    Reviewed by:    allanjude, kevans
+    MFC after:      2 weeks
+    Differential Revision:  https://reviews.freebsd.org/D31760
+
+
+--- auth.c
++++ auth.c
+@@ -566,6 +566,9 @@ getpwnamallow(struct ssh *ssh, const char *user)
+ {
+ #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
+ 	extern login_cap_t *lc;
++#ifdef HAVE_AUTH_HOSTOK
++	const char *from_host, *from_ip;
++#endif
+ #ifdef BSD_AUTH
+ 	auth_session_t *as;
+ #endif
+@@ -611,6 +614,21 @@ getpwnamallow(struct ssh *ssh, const char *user)
+ 		debug("unable to get login class: %s", user);
+ 		return (NULL);
+ 	}
++#ifdef HAVE_AUTH_HOSTOK
++	from_host = auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, options.use_dns);
++	from_ip = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
++	if (!auth_hostok(lc, from_host, from_ip)) {
++		debug("Denied connection for %.200s from %.200s [%.200s].",
++		      pw->pw_name, from_host, from_ip);
++		return (NULL);
++	}
++#endif /* HAVE_AUTH_HOSTOK */
++#ifdef HAVE_AUTH_TIMEOK
++	if (!auth_timeok(lc, time(NULL))) {
++		debug("LOGIN %.200s REFUSED (TIME)", pw->pw_name);
++		return (NULL);
++	}
++#endif /* HAVE_AUTH_TIMEOK */
+ #ifdef BSD_AUTH
+ 	if ((as = auth_open()) == NULL || auth_setpwd(as, pw) != 0 ||
+ 	    auth_approval(as, lc, pw->pw_name, "ssh") <= 0) {
+--- configure.ac
++++ configure.ac
+@@ -1784,6 +1784,8 @@ AC_SUBST([PICFLAG])
+ 
+ dnl    Checks for library functions. Please keep in alphabetical order
+ AC_CHECK_FUNCS([ \
++	auth_hostok \
++	auth_timeok \
+ 	Blowfish_initstate \
+ 	Blowfish_expandstate \
+ 	Blowfish_expand0state \

security/openssh-portable/files/patch-auth2.c

@@ -1,47 +0,0 @@
---- UTC
-r99053 | des | 2002-06-29 05:57:13 -0500 (Sat, 29 Jun 2002) | 4 lines
-Changed paths:
-   M /head/crypto/openssh/auth2.c
-
-Apply class-imposed login restrictions.
-
---- auth2.c.orig	2020-09-27 00:25:01.000000000 -0700
-+++ auth2.c	2020-11-16 13:55:25.222771000 -0800
-@@ -266,6 +266,10 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct
- 	char *user = NULL, *service = NULL, *method = NULL, *style = NULL;
- 	int r, authenticated = 0;
- 	double tstart = monotime_double();
-+#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
-+	login_cap_t *lc;
-+	const char *from_host, *from_ip;
-+#endif
- 
- 	if (authctxt == NULL)
- 		fatal("input_userauth_request: no authctxt");
-@@ -317,6 +321,26 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct
- 		    "not allowed: (%s,%s) -> (%s,%s)",
- 		    authctxt->user, authctxt->service, user, service);
- 	}
-+
-+#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
-+	if (authctxt->pw != NULL &&
-+	    (lc = login_getpwclass(authctxt->pw)) != NULL) {
-+		from_host = auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, options.use_dns);
-+		from_ip = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
-+		if (!auth_hostok(lc, from_host, from_ip)) {
-+			logit("Denied connection for %.200s from %.200s [%.200s].",
-+			    authctxt->pw->pw_name, from_host, from_ip);
-+			ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Sorry, you are not allowed to connect.");
-+		}
-+		if (!auth_timeok(lc, time(NULL))) {
-+			logit("LOGIN %.200s REFUSED (TIME) FROM %.200s",
-+			    authctxt->pw->pw_name, from_host);
-+			ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Logins not available right now.");
-+		}
-+		login_close(lc);
-+	}
-+#endif  /* HAVE_LOGIN_CAP */
-+
- 	/* reset state */
- 	auth2_challenge_stop(ssh);
- 

security/openssh-portable/files/patch-platform-tracing.c

@@ -1,25 +0,0 @@
---- platform-tracing.c.orig	2021-09-26 07:03:19.000000000 -0700
-+++ platform-tracing.c	2021-10-15 10:08:20.537813000 -0700
-@@ -16,6 +16,10 @@
- 
- #include "includes.h"
- 
-+#if defined(HAVE_PROCCTL)
-+#include <string.h>
-+#include <unistd.h>
-+#endif
- #include <sys/types.h>
- #ifdef HAVE_SYS_PROCCTL_H
- #include <sys/procctl.h>
-@@ -40,8 +44,9 @@ platform_disable_tracing(int strict)
- 	/* On FreeBSD, we should make this process untraceable */
- 	int disable_trace = PROC_TRACE_CTL_DISABLE;
- 
--	if (procctl(P_PID, 0, PROC_TRACE_CTL, &disable_trace) && strict)
--		fatal("unable to make the process untraceable");
-+	if (procctl(P_PID, getpid(), PROC_TRACE_CTL, &disable_trace) && strict)
-+		fatal("unable to make the process untraceable: %s for pid %d",
-+		    strerror(errno), (int)getpid());
- #endif
- #if defined(HAVE_PRCTL) && defined(PR_SET_DUMPABLE)
- 	/* Disable ptrace on Linux without sgid bit */

security/openssh-portable/files/patch-ssh-agent.c

@@ -8,9 +8,9 @@ r226103 | des | 2011-10-07 08:10:16 -0500 (Fri, 07 Oct 2011) | 5 lines
 Add a -x option that causes ssh-agent(1) to exit when all clients have
 disconnected.
 
---- ssh-agent.c.orig	2021-04-15 20:55:25.000000000 -0700
-+++ ssh-agent.c	2021-04-27 11:47:59.362589000 -0700
-@@ -171,9 +171,26 @@ static int fingerprint_hash = SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT;
+--- ssh-agent.c.orig	2023-02-02 04:21:54.000000000 -0800
++++ ssh-agent.c	2023-02-03 10:55:34.277561000 -0800
+@@ -188,11 +188,28 @@ static int restrict_websafe = 1;
  /* Refuse signing of non-SSH messages for web-origin FIDO keys */
  static int restrict_websafe = 1;
  
@@ -27,17 +27,19 @@ disconnected.
  static void
  close_socket(SocketEntry *e)
  {
+ 	size_t i;
 +	int last = 0;
-+
+ 
 +	if (e->type == AUTH_CONNECTION) {
 +		debug("xcount %d -> %d", xcount, xcount - 1);
 +		if (--xcount == 0)
 +			last = 1;
 +	}
++
  	close(e->fd);
  	sshbuf_free(e->input);
  	sshbuf_free(e->output);
-@@ -181,6 +198,8 @@ close_socket(SocketEntry *e)
+@@ -205,6 +222,8 @@ close_socket(SocketEntry *e)
  	memset(e, '\0', sizeof(*e));
  	e->fd = -1;
  	e->type = AUTH_UNUSED;
@@ -46,7 +48,7 @@ disconnected.
  }
  
  static void
-@@ -1067,6 +1086,10 @@ new_socket(sock_type type, int fd)
+@@ -1698,6 +1717,10 @@ new_socket(sock_type type, int fd)
  
  	debug_f("type = %s", type == AUTH_CONNECTION ? "CONNECTION" :
  	    (type == AUTH_SOCKET ? "SOCKET" : "UNKNOWN"));
@@ -57,16 +59,16 @@ disconnected.
  	set_nonblock(fd);
  
  	if (fd > max_fd)
-@@ -1360,7 +1383,7 @@ static void
+@@ -1990,7 +2013,7 @@ usage(void)
  usage(void)
  {
  	fprintf(stderr,
 -	    "usage: ssh-agent [-c | -s] [-Dd] [-a bind_address] [-E fingerprint_hash]\n"
 +	    "usage: ssh-agent [-c | -s] [-Ddx] [-a bind_address] [-E fingerprint_hash]\n"
- 	    "                 [-P allowed_providers] [-t life]\n"
- 	    "       ssh-agent [-a bind_address] [-E fingerprint_hash] [-P allowed_providers]\n"
- 	    "                 [-t life] command [arg ...]\n"
-@@ -1394,6 +1417,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 	    "                 [-O option] [-P allowed_providers] [-t life]\n"
+ 	    "       ssh-agent [-a bind_address] [-E fingerprint_hash] [-O option]\n"
+ 	    "                 [-P allowed_providers] [-t life] command [arg ...]\n"
+@@ -2024,6 +2047,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
  	/* drop */
  	setegid(getgid());
  	setgid(getgid());
@@ -74,7 +76,7 @@ disconnected.
  
  	platform_disable_tracing(0);	/* strict=no */
  
-@@ -1405,7 +1429,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+@@ -2035,7 +2059,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
  	__progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]);
  	seed_rng();
  
@@ -83,7 +85,7 @@ disconnected.
  		switch (ch) {
  		case 'E':
  			fingerprint_hash = ssh_digest_alg_by_name(optarg);
-@@ -1454,6 +1478,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+@@ -2084,6 +2108,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
  				fprintf(stderr, "Invalid lifetime\n");
  				usage();
  			}

security/openssh-portable/files/patch-sshd_config

@@ -1,5 +1,8 @@
---- sshd_config.orig	2021-08-19 21:03:49.000000000 -0700
-+++ sshd_config	2021-09-07 12:34:49.372652000 -0700
+!!!
+!!! Note files/extra-patch-pam-sshd_config contains more changes for default PAM option.
+!!!
+--- sshd_config.orig	2022-02-11 18:49:55.062881000 +0000
++++ sshd_config	2022-02-11 18:52:31.639435000 +0000
 @@ -10,6 +10,9 @@
  # possible, but leave them commented.  Uncommented options override the
  # default value.
@@ -20,33 +23,7 @@
  
  #AuthorizedPrincipalsFile none
  
-@@ -53,8 +55,8 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile	.ssh/authorized_keys
- # Don't read the user's ~/.rhosts and ~/.shosts files
- #IgnoreRhosts yes
- 
--# To disable tunneled clear text passwords, change to no here!
--#PasswordAuthentication yes
-+# To enable tunneled clear text passwords, change to yes here!
-+#PasswordAuthentication no
- #PermitEmptyPasswords no
- 
- # Change to no to disable s/key passwords
-@@ -70,7 +72,7 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile	.ssh/authorized_keys
- #GSSAPIAuthentication no
- #GSSAPICleanupCredentials yes
- 
--# Set this to 'yes' to enable PAM authentication, account processing,
-+# Set this to 'no' to disable PAM authentication, account processing,
- # and session processing. If this is enabled, PAM authentication will
- # be allowed through the KbdInteractiveAuthentication and
- # PasswordAuthentication.  Depending on your PAM configuration,
-@@ -79,12 +81,12 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile	.ssh/authorized_keys
- # If you just want the PAM account and session checks to run without
- # PAM authentication, then enable this but set PasswordAuthentication
- # and KbdInteractiveAuthentication to 'no'.
--#UsePAM no
-+#UsePAM yes
- 
+@@ -84,7 +86,7 @@
  #AllowAgentForwarding yes
  #AllowTcpForwarding yes
  #GatewayPorts no

security/openssh-portable/files/patch-sshd_config.5

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
---- sshd_config.5.orig	2017-03-19 19:39:27.000000000 -0700
-+++ sshd_config.5	2017-03-20 11:48:37.553620000 -0700
-@@ -671,7 +673,9 @@ ssh-ed25519,ssh-rsa
- The list of available key types may also be obtained using
- .Qq ssh -Q key .
+--- sshd_config.5.orig	2022-02-11 18:50:00.822679000 +0000
++++ sshd_config.5	2022-02-11 19:09:05.162504000 +0000
+@@ -701,7 +701,9 @@
+ .Qq ssh -Q HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms .
+ This was formerly named HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes.
  .It Cm HostbasedAuthentication
 -Specifies whether rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv authentication together
 +Specifies whether rhosts or
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@
  with successful public key client host authentication is allowed
  (host-based authentication).
  The default is
-@@ -1136,7 +1140,22 @@ are refused if the number of unauthentic
+@@ -1277,7 +1279,23 @@
  .It Cm PasswordAuthentication
  Specifies whether password authentication is allowed.
  The default is
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
 +.Nm sshd
 +was built without PAM support, in which case the default is
  .Cm yes .
++.Pp
 +Note that if
 +.Cm ChallengeResponseAuthentication
 +is
@@ -34,7 +35,7 @@
  .It Cm PermitEmptyPasswords
  When password authentication is allowed, it specifies whether the
  server allows login to accounts with empty password strings.
-@@ -1232,6 +1251,13 @@ and
+@@ -1416,6 +1434,13 @@
  .Cm ethernet .
  The default is
  .Cm no .
@@ -48,12 +49,15 @@
  .Pp
  Independent of this setting, the permissions of the selected
  .Xr tun 4
-@@ -1493,12 +1519,15 @@ is enabled, you will not be able to run
+@@ -1774,12 +1799,19 @@
  .Xr sshd 8
  as a non-root user.
  The default is
--.Cm no .
-+.Cm yes .
++.Cm yes ,
++unless
++.Nm sshd
++was built without PAM support, in which case the default is
+ .Cm no .
  .It Cm VersionAddendum
  Optionally specifies additional text to append to the SSH protocol banner
  sent by the server upon connection.
@@ -66,7 +70,7 @@
  .It Cm X11DisplayOffset
  Specifies the first display number available for
  .Xr sshd 8 Ns 's
-@@ -1512,7 +1541,7 @@ The argument must be
+@@ -1793,7 +1825,7 @@
  or
  .Cm no .
  The default is

security/openssh-portable/pkg-descr

@@ -11,5 +11,3 @@ The portable OpenSSH follows development of the official version, but releases
 are not synchronized. Portable releases are marked with a 'p' (e.g. 3.1p1).
 The official OpenBSD source will never use the 'p' suffix, but will instead
 increment the version number when they hit 'stable spots' in their development.
-
-WWW: https://www.openssh.com/portable.html

security/patch-9.8-cves

@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+https://lists.mindrot.org/pipermail/openssh-unix-dev/2024-July/041431.html
+
+Damien Miller djm at mindrot.org
+Mon Jul 1 18:21:11 AEST 2024
+Previous message (by thread): Announce: OpenSSH 9.8 released
+Next message (by thread): Announce: OpenSSH 9.8 released
+Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ]
+Hi,
+
+Regarding the race condition fixed in OpenSSH 9.8. A mitigation to
+prevent exploitation of this bug is to disable the login grace timer
+by setting LoginGraceTime=0 in sshd_config. This will however make
+it much easier for an attacker to deny service to sshd.
+
+Similarly, the much more minor keystroke timing bug can be avoided
+by disabling the feature using ObscureKeystrokeTiming=0.
+
+Some users will understandably prefer to patch their OpenSSH rather
+than upgrade to the newest version, so here are minimal patches for
+both problems.
+
+1) Critical race condition in sshd
+
+2) Minor logic error in ObscureKeystrokeTiming
+
+--- log.c.orig	2024-07-02 09:05:35.023051000 -0700
++++ log.c	2024-07-02 09:05:54.881067000 -0700
+@@ -451,12 +451,14 @@ sshsigdie(const char *file, const char *func, int line
+ sshsigdie(const char *file, const char *func, int line, int showfunc,
+     LogLevel level, const char *suffix, const char *fmt, ...)
+ {
++#ifdef SYSLOG_R_SAFE_IN_SIGHAND
+ 	va_list args;
+ 
+ 	va_start(args, fmt);
+ 	sshlogv(file, func, line, showfunc, SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL,
+ 	    suffix, fmt, args);
+ 	va_end(args);
++#endif
+ 	_exit(1);
+ }
+ 
+--- clientloop.c.orig	2024-07-02 09:06:09.736347000 -0700
++++ clientloop.c	2024-07-02 09:06:41.414979000 -0700
+@@ -608,8 +608,9 @@ obfuscate_keystroke_timing(struct ssh *ssh, struct tim
+ 		if (timespeccmp(&now, &chaff_until, >=)) {
+ 			/* Stop if there have been no keystrokes for a while */
+ 			stop_reason = "chaff time expired";
+-		} else if (timespeccmp(&now, &next_interval, >=)) {
+-			/* Otherwise if we were due to send, then send chaff */
++		} else if (timespeccmp(&now, &next_interval, >=) &&
++		    !ssh_packet_have_data_to_write(ssh)) {
++			/* If due to send but have no data, then send chaff */
+ 			if (send_chaff(ssh))
+ 				nchaff++;
+ 		}